

# THE INSTITUTIONAL LIFE OF ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

*Alicia Solow-Niederman,<sup>†</sup> YooJung Choi<sup>‡‡</sup> & Guy Van den Broeck<sup>‡‡‡</sup>*

## ABSTRACT

As states nationwide turn to risk assessment algorithms as tools for criminal justice reform, scholars and civil society actors alike are increasingly warning that this technological turn comes with complications. Research to date tends to focus on fairness, accountability, and transparency within algorithmic tools. Although attention to whether these instruments are fair or biased is normatively essential, this Article contends that this inquiry cannot be the whole conversation. Looking at issues such as fairness or bias in a tool in isolation elides vital bigger-picture considerations about the institutions and political systems within which tools are developed and deployed. Using California's Money Bail Reform Act of 2017 (SB 10) as an example, this Article analyzes how risk assessment statutes create frameworks within which policymakers and technical actors are constrained and empowered when it comes to the design and implementation of a particular instrument. Specifically, it focuses on the tension between, on one hand, a top-down, global understanding of fairness, accuracy, and lack of bias, and, on the other, a tool that is well-tailored to local considerations. It explores three potential technical and associated policy consequences of SB 10's framework: proxies, Simpson's paradox, and thresholding. And it calls for greater attention to the design of risk assessment statutes and their allocation of global and local authority.

---

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38WD3Q226>

© 2019 Alicia Solow-Niederman, YooJung Choi & Guy Van den Broeck.

<sup>†</sup> 2017–19 PULSE Fellow, UCLA School of Law and 2019–20 Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Alicia Solow-Niederman completed this work during her tenure as a PULSE Fellow, and the arguments advanced here are made in her personal capacity.

<sup>‡‡</sup> Ph.D Student, UCLA, Department of Computer Science.

<sup>‡‡‡</sup> Assistant Professor and Samuelli Fellow, UCLA Department of Computer Science. The authors are grateful to participants at the 2019 We Robot Conference and the March 2019 PULSE Workshop on AI and Law Enforcement. Thanks also to Solon Barocas, Chris Bavitz, Kristian Lum, Deirdre Mulligan, Richard Re, and the members of the UC Berkeley Algorithmic Fairness & Opacity Working Group for thoughtful comments and helpful conversations. This work is partially supported by NSF grants IIS-1657613, IIS-1633857, and CCF-1837129. Finally, many thanks to the editors of the *Berkeley Technology Law Journal*.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>706</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS.....</b>	<b>710</b>
	A. ACTUARIAL JUSTICE: A BRIEF HISTORY .....	710
	B. ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT: A RECENT HISTORY.....	714
<b>III.</b>	<b>SB 10'S STATUTORY STRUCTURE.....</b>	<b>718</b>
<b>IV.</b>	<b>ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE: POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SB 10 FRAMEWORK.</b>	<b>724</b>
	A. PROXIES .....	725
	B. SIMPSON'S PARADOX.....	731
	C. THRESHOLDING .....	734
<b>V.</b>	<b>PATHS FORWARD .....</b>	<b>740</b>
<b>VI.</b>	<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>743</b>

### I. INTRODUCTION

On August 28, 2018, California passed the California Money Bail Reform Act, also known as Senate Bill 10 (SB 10), and eliminated the state's system of money bail. Lauded by politicians as a “transformative” measure,<sup>1</sup> SB 10 aimed to deploy algorithmic pretrial risk assessment to combat socioeconomic disparities in the criminal justice system. But even groups that have long supported criminal justice reform criticized SB 10's final text, raising concerns about an “overly broad presumption of preventative detention” that compromised due process and racial justice.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not it makes sense to eliminate money bail is a policy decision beyond the scope of this Article. Still, any such policy decision must account for the fact that algorithmic pretrial assessments are not an objective substitute for subjective human considerations.

---

1. See *Governor Brown Signs Legislation to Revamp California's Bail System*, CA.GOV (Aug. 28, 2018), <https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2018/08/28/governor-brown-signs-legislation-to-revamp-californias-bail-system-protect-public-safety/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/772Z-YJ6C>] (quoting California State Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye) (“This is a transformative day for our justice system. Our old system of money bail was outdated, unsafe, and unfair.”); see also *id.* (quoting former Governor Jerry Brown) (“Today, California reforms its bail system so that rich and poor alike are treated fairly.”).

2. *ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation*, ACLU (Aug. 20, 2018), <https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-california-changes-position-oppose-bail-reform-legislation> [<https://perma.cc/9MEP-9DXW>].

Algorithmic risk assessment begins with the premise that an algorithm can provide a concrete measure of risk that informs a judge of salient facts about the defendant. But this premise is questionable, and a rapidly growing legal and technical literature has begun to underscore how and why data-driven algorithms are not automatically unbiased.<sup>3</sup> Building from a long-standing critique of actuarial assessments in criminal justice,<sup>4</sup> scholars, civil society members, and policymakers alike are contending with questions of bias and accountability,<sup>5</sup> competing definitions of fairness within such algorithms,<sup>6</sup> and concerns about the ways in which automated tools may reinforce underlying societal inequities.<sup>7</sup> Research to date tends to focus on fairness, accountability, and transparency<sup>8</sup> within the tools, urging technologists and policymakers to recognize the normative implications of these technical interventions.<sup>9</sup> While questions such as whether these

---

3. For instance, as an April 2019 report by the Partnership on AI emphasizes, “[a]lthough the use of these [algorithmic risk assessment] tools is in part motivated by the desire to mitigate existing human fallibility in the criminal justice system, it is a serious misunderstanding to view tools as objective or neutral simply because they are based on data.” *Report on Algorithmic Risk Assessment Tools in the U.S. Criminal Justice System*, PARTNERSHIP ON AI 3 (Apr. 2019), <https://www.partnershiponai.org/report-on-machine-learning-in-risk-assessment-tools-in-the-u-s-criminal-justice-system/> [https://perma.cc/PN9D-68Q5].

4. See discussion *infra* notes 15–25.

5. See, e.g., Vienna Thompkins, *What Are Risk Assessments—and How Do They Advance Criminal Justice Reform?*, BRENNAN CTR. (Aug. 23, 2018), <https://www.brennan-center.org/blog/what-are-risk-assessments-and-how-do-they-advance-criminal-justice-reform> [https://perma.cc/X8KS-CBCG]; Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., *The New Science of Sentencing*, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing> [https://perma.cc/99KU-Q4NC].

6. For an accessible overview of different technical definitions of fairness, see Arvind Narayanan, *Tutorial: 21 Fairness Definitions and Their Politics*, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2018), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jIXIuYdnnyk> [https://perma.cc/2VGP-M95T].

7. See, e.g., Eric Holder, *Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference*, JUSTICE.GOV (Aug. 1, 2014), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th> [https://perma.cc/9E5C-MRSZ] (“By basing sentencing decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics . . . [risk assessment tools] may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society.”).

8. See generally *Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT\*)*, FAT CONF., <https://fatconference.org/index.html> [https://perma.cc/8ASD-V9JG] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).

9. By “normative,” this Article broadly refers to the effect of an intervention on the common good and the life and liberty of individuals. Cf. Laurence Solum, *Legal Theory Lexicon: Welfare, Well-Being, and Happiness*, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (May 31, 2009), [https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/normative\\_legal\\_theory/](https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/normative_legal_theory/) [https://perma.cc/3CGY-F4PQ] (“[A]ny or most of the reasonable views about normative theory agree that what is good or bad for individual humans is morally salient.”).

instruments are fair or biased are normatively essential, this Article contends that they cannot be the whole conversation. Automated risk assessment systems are not sterile tools that operate in a vacuum; rather, they are dynamic, norm-laden interventions that must be deployed within complex webs of new and preexisting policy requirements as well as legal institutions, rules, and associated social practices.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, looking at issues such as fairness or bias in a tool in isolation elides vital bigger-picture considerations about the institutions and political systems within which tools are developed and deployed.<sup>11</sup>

Although SB 10 has been stayed pending a 2020 ballot referendum,<sup>12</sup> its statutory framework offers a real-world example of the political, legal, and

---

10. A growing number of nonprofit entities and academics recognize this point. *See, e.g., Report on Algorithmic Risk Assessment Tools in the U.S. Criminal Justice System*, *supra* note 3, at 3 (articulating risk assessment challenges at three levels: “1. Concerns about the validity, accuracy, and bias in the tools themselves; 2. Issues with the interface between the tools and the humans who interact with them; and 3. Questions of governance, transparency, and accountability”); Laurel Eckhouse et al., *Layers of Bias: A Unified Approach for Understanding Problems with Risk Assessment*, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 185, 205 (2019) [hereinafter Eckhouse et al., *Layers of Bias*] (offering a framework to assess “layers of bias” in algorithmic risk assessment and emphasizing that every layer requires “human judgment about what fairness means”); Megan T. Stevenson, *Assessing Risk Assessment in Action*, 3 MINN. L. REV. 303, 306, 317 (2018) [hereinafter Stevenson, *Assessing Risk Assessment*] (underscoring “people and design choices” behind risk assessment and describing decisions about predicting risk, selecting a risk prediction algorithm, and dividing groups into classification levels as “choices that depend, at least partially, on the normative and legal landscape”); Jessica M. Eaglin, *Constructing Recidivism Risk*, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61 (2017) (examining “normative judgments entailed in the development of predictive recidivism risk information”).

11. Legal scholars have recently decried a lack of concrete evidence about risk assessment tools’ efficacy and called for a more practical, empirically informed approach to evaluating risk assessment algorithms. *See* Stevenson, *Assessing Risk Assessment*, *supra* note 10, at 305–06; Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, *Judging Risk*, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3190403> (manuscript at 30) [hereinafter Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*] (“[F]ar more attention must be paid to the structure of decisionmaking that is supposed to be informed by risk assessment.”). This Article concurs that attention to real-world outcomes, and not merely abstract risks, is imperative. It begins its human- and design-focused analysis one level up from the risk assessment tools themselves. This Article is the first account to evaluate the ways in which legislative choices about a risk assessment regime create a particular institutional context within which tools operate—and how this institutional context in turn structures the affordances and limitations of the tools.

12. SB 10 was temporarily stayed after a coalition of bail bond industry groups engaged the state’s direct democracy system and placed a referendum on SB 10 on California’s 2020 ballot. *See SB 10: Pretrial Release and Detention*, CAL. CTS., <https://www.courts.ca.gov/pretrial.htm> [<https://perma.cc/3ZZF-GF5N>] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019); *see also* Jazmine Ulloa, *Bail Bond Industry Moves to Block Sweeping California Law, Submitting Signatures for a 2020 Ballot Referendum*, LA TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018, 4:05 PM), <https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-referendum-signatures-20181120-story.html> [<https://perma.cc/QS93-8BZL>].

statistical tradeoffs inherent in risk assessment statutes. This Article’s detailed analysis of SB 10 focuses on a tension between, on the one hand, a top-down, *global* understanding of fairness, accuracy, and lack of bias, and, on the other hand, a tool that is well-tailored to *local* considerations. Anytime there is both a more centralized body that sets overarching guidelines about the tool and a risk assessment algorithm that must be tailored to reflect local jurisdictional conditions, as we will see is the case in SB 10, there will be a *global-local tension*. For instance, the pursuit of a single, statewide understanding of a first principle like non-discrimination—as consistency and rule of law might demand—requires technical tradeoffs in the fairness and accuracy of the tool. Risk assessment tools must be validated with reference to the particular conditions of application.<sup>13</sup> Yet such validation of a tool to make it more fair or accurate at a local level—as technological best practices demand—can produce different ground-level understandings of what fairness and accuracy require. And this local variability is in tension with a top-down, global understanding of the normative principle. In practice, any attempt to protect a normative principle within an algorithmic tool must be operationalized within the system of *algorithmic federalism* that we create each time a jurisdiction (typically a state) adopts risk assessment and then deploys the associated algorithmic risk assessment tool in its sub-jurisdictions (typically counties) that are responsible for discrete policy and technical steps in the instrument’s creation and use.<sup>14</sup>

---

13. See, e.g., PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., OFFENDER RISK & NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 21 (2014) (“A local validation study will (a) inform any modifications that must be made to the content of the tool to optimize predictive validity in the local jurisdiction and ensure that it meets basic minimum scientific standards, and (b) inform the development of appropriate cutoff values for categorizing offenders into different risk levels.”); Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*, *supra* note 11 (manuscript at 40) (“Instruments should be re-validated over time, at reasonable intervals, and with attention to local variation in populations, resources, and crime patterns.”) (internal citation omitted); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, *Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and The Future of Bail Reform*, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1757 (2018) [hereinafter Koepke & Robinson, *Danger Ahead*] (“For tools to make well-calibrated predictions from the start, they need to be trained on data that matches the conditions about which they are making predictions.”).

14. Immense thanks to Kiel Brennan-Marquez for suggesting this term during an early presentation of this project. Akin to other federated decision-making bodies, “algorithmic federalism” refers to algorithmic systems that feature jurisdiction-wide authority over algorithmic policy but also include substantial space for regional or local bodies to accomplish whatever objective the algorithmic policy intervention seeks. For instance, SB 10 features both a statewide policy authority and county-wide bodies responsible for managing large portions of the technical implementation and contending with the policy outcomes. In future work (tentatively titled *Algorithmic Localism*), Alicia Solow-Niedermaier intends to apply existing scholarship on federalism and localism to explore local and global tensions, with an eye to the costs and benefits of allocating decision-making authority and discretion at different levels.

This Article uses SB 10 to explore a subset of these challenges, emphasizing particular technical issues that arise from the way that this statute allocates authority and discretion. It proceeds in four Parts. Part II first surveys the adoption of actuarial criminal justice tools in the twentieth century. It then canvasses recent state moves to implement algorithmic risk assessment tools as well as associated legal controversies and scholarly critiques. Part III describes SB 10 as an example of one state's plan to deploy risk assessment instruments. Specifically, it summarizes particular SB 10 provisions and their legislative history, focusing on how the provisions grant authority and discretion to institutional actors at both the state and local level. Part IV applies this analysis with a series of hypothetical narratives drawn from real-world demographic data in California. These narratives illustrate how even the best-intentioned actions can lead to unanticipated or undesirable results, given the way that a statute allocates authority to state and county-level actors. Part V considers how to design risk assessment statutes in light of the inevitable *global-local tension*. It closes by proposing that a policy choice to insert too many *layers of discretion* is likely to be problematic, no matter which tool is adopted, before offering several specific recommendations that could improve risk assessment statutes in general and SB 10 in particular.

## II. RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS

### A. ACTUARIAL JUSTICE: A BRIEF HISTORY

Contemporary risk assessment instruments share a common heritage with far older criminal justice interventions. The link between old and new is the idea that public officers can make predictions about an individual's behavior that should inform the treatment of that individual today. This Section's stylized overview contextualizes contemporary algorithms as the latest iteration of this historic phenomenon.

For much of the twentieth century, choices about human liberty depended on obviously subjective factors. In the 1920s, parole boards began frequently invoking "crime prediction" in decisions about sentence length.<sup>15</sup> Factors included "'the look in the prisoner's eye,' or [parole] board members' personal experiences, intuition, and biases."<sup>16</sup> And in making bail

---

15. See Thomas Mathiesen, *Selective Incapacitation Revisited*, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 455, 458–59 (1998); Kevin R. Reitz, "Risk Discretion" at Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT'G REP. 68, 70 (2017) ("[P]rison sentence lengths in most U.S. jurisdictions are already based on predictions or guesses about offenders' future behavior, and this has been true—in multiple settings—for at least a century.").

16. Reitz, *supra* note 15, at 69 (citing DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980);

and sentencing determinations, “clinical prediction,” or “the largely unstructured clinical judgment of skilled practitioners,” was used to assess the likelihood of recidivism.<sup>17</sup> Outside of the parole or pretrial context, moreover, police officers and agencies have long made choices about where to allocate limited resources based on risk assessment,<sup>18</sup> which is an inherently predictive enterprise.

Two significant types of changes occurred in the back half of the twentieth century. One significant shift was methodological. In the 1960s and 1970s, a growing sense that clinical predictions were unfairly subjective and hence susceptible to improper bias catalyzed evidence-based interventions.<sup>19</sup> The resulting tools were “actuarial.”<sup>20</sup> Rather than relying on subjective expertise, these actuarial tools invoked statistics to “assign a quantitative risk score to an offender by assessing unalterable (e.g., static) individual factors (i.e., history of substance abuse and age at first offense) that have been statistically linked to the risk of recidivism in correctional populations and based on research involving large population samples.”<sup>21</sup> In contrast to the paradigm shift from subjective to actuarial tools, subsequent developments have been more evolutionary. Over time, a third generation of statistical tools expanded beyond “static risk factors (such as criminal history, age, and gender)” to consider risks, needs, and “both static and dynamic risk factors such as educational status [and] employment.”<sup>22</sup> As Kelly Hannah-Moffat explains, tools that rely on more dynamic factors are distinct because they

---

MARVIN E. FRANKEL, *CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER* (1973)); *see also* BERNARD HARCOURT, *AGAINST PREDICTION*, 7–18 (2007) (discussing parole boards’ use of risk assessment instruments since the 1920s).

17. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, *Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition*, 30 *JUST. Q.* 270, 274 (2013).

18. This Article adopts a common definition of risk assessment: “the process of using risk factors [factors that precede and statistically correlate with recidivism] to estimate the likelihood (i.e., probability) of an outcome occurring in a population.” *See* Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*, *supra* note 11 (manuscript at 7) (citing CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., TECH., & GOV’T, *RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING* (1993)).

19. For discussion of studies reporting bias in human judgment, *see* Eckhouse et al., *Layers of Bias*, *supra* note 10, at 17–18.

20. As used here, “actuarial” refers broadly to empirically informed assessments, and thus contrasts with judgments based only on professionals’ clinical decisions. *Cf.* NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44087, *RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 10* (2018) (“[I]t is argued that utilizing actuarial rather than clinical (i.e., professional judgment alone) risk assessment makes the process more objective and less susceptible to rater bias.”).

21. Hannah-Moffat, *Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition*, *supra* note 17, at 274. For a discussion of static tools’ limitations, *see id.*

22. Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*, *supra* note 11 (manuscript at 10); *see also* Hannah-Moffat, *supra* note 17, at 274–77.

“focus on treatment or rehabilitation of the offender to prevent reoffending, rather than simply predict recidivism . . . . This approach to risk differs importantly from the correctional use of static risk for preventive or selective incapacitation, diversion, or deterrence of recidivism through the administration of harsh penalties . . . .”<sup>23</sup> The fourth generation of tools continued to use various combinations of static and dynamic inputs while according more weight to the individualized needs of the defendant.<sup>24</sup> The fifth generation entails the application of machine learning techniques, discussed below, to provide more up-to-date predictions that take far more factors into account.<sup>25</sup>

Driven in large part by political forces and associated policy changes,<sup>26</sup> a second and partially overlapping shift attempted to limit what categories of inputs were permissible when imposing bail. The early 1960s witnessed mounting concern with overcrowded jails and the detention of less wealthy defendants, even when such individuals did not pose any public safety risk if they were released.<sup>27</sup> These reform efforts culminated with Congress’s enactment of the 1966 Bail Reform Act, which aimed to “minimize reliance on money bail[,] . . . established that a defendant’s financial status should not be a reason for denying their pretrial release, made clear that the risk of nonappearance at trial should be the only criterion considered when bail is assessed, and . . . generally forb[ade] judges from treating a defendant’s dangerousness or risk to public safety as a reason for detention.”<sup>28</sup>

But this initiative did not endure. In the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government undertook a fundamental reworking of the underlying reason for imposing bail.<sup>29</sup> Catalyzed by mounting public unrest in the civil rights era and the Nixon Administration’s “tough on crime” stance, a second set of reforms effectively reversed the earlier policy. Rather than set terms that ensured a defendant’s presence in court, pretrial detention emphasized the risk that the defendant would commit future crimes and threaten public safety.<sup>30</sup> In practice, as it emerged, this shift reframed the salient questions and asked judges to assess a defendant’s perceived “dangerousness” to

---

23. Hannah-Moffat, *supra* note 17, at 276. For a more detailed account of risk/needs assessment in more modern tools, see *id.* at 274–76.

24. Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*, *supra* note 11 (manuscript at 10).

25. *Id.*

26. This overview is indebted to John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson’s summary of this history. See Koepke & Robinson, *Danger Ahead*, *supra* note 13, at 1731–42.

27. See Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*, *supra* note 11 (manuscript at 9).

28. *Id.* (citing *United States v. Leathers*, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).

29. For a more detailed survey of changing bail practices in the United States, see Koepke & Robinson, *Danger Ahead*, *supra* note 13, at 1737–50.

30. Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*, *supra* note 11 (manuscript at 10); see also Koepke & Robinson, *supra* note 13, at 1739–43.

determine the risk they posed.<sup>31</sup> Congress formally codified this evolution during the Reagan Administration with the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act, which required federal judges to “consider danger to the community in all cases in setting conditions of release.”<sup>32</sup> States largely followed the federal government’s lead, marking a national shift in the discourse around risk assessment.<sup>33</sup>

The move towards assessing “dangerousness” goes hand-in-hand with the ongoing evolution of predictive risk assessment instruments. To date, risk assessment tools rely on relatively simple machine learning models, such as logistic regression, and do not yet embrace more complex machine learning models.<sup>34</sup> Machine learning operates by parsing large datasets to identify patterns in the data, which allows the development of a predictive function that can be applied to previously unseen data sets.<sup>35</sup> The use of an algorithm might be more standardized than the older clinical assessment based on, say, the look in the person’s eye.<sup>36</sup> Yet it does not make the predictive enterprise objective; rather, it turns on a spate of human choices about what data to use, what statistical model to adopt, how to “tune” the model, and how to apply the findings.<sup>37</sup> As more complex machine learning methods are integrated into risk assessment instruments, it will become even more

---

31. Though beyond the scope of this paper, these developments occurred in tandem with a “selective incapacitation” movement that focused on detaining the most “dangerous” defendants. This effort dovetails with many of the objectives of recidivism-based risk assessment. For an analysis of contemporary lessons for algorithm risk assessment drawn from the history of selective incapacitation, see Danielle Kehl et al., *Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing*, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE 3 (2017), <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041> [<https://perma.cc/L7R9-K2W9>].

32. *United States v. Himler*, 797 F.2d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Koepke & Robinson, *Danger Ahead*, *supra* note 13, at 1742.

33. See Koepke & Robinson, *Danger Ahead*, *supra* note 13, at 1740–41.

34. See *id.* at 1781 (suggesting that risk assessment is likely to progress from “logistic regression-based techniques toward more complex machine learning techniques”). Legal scholarship at times seems to distinguish between “real” machine learning and actuarial science based on logistic regression and other statistical methods. Rather than advance such a dichotomy, this Article positions contemporary risk assessment algorithms based on logistic regression as a simple machine learning model.

35. For discussion of machine learning, see generally VISHAL MAINI & SAMER SABRI, *MACHINE LEARNING FOR HUMANS* (2017). In supervised machine learning, the dominant contemporary method, the data scientist will “tune” different parameters to improve a selected statistical model’s ability to deliver results that are closer to a predefined goal, or “objective function.” *Id.*

36. See discussion *supra* text accompanying notes 15–18 and sources cited therein.

37. For an overview of the different steps necessary to arrive at a working machine learning model, see David Lehr & Paul Ohm, *Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning*, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017).

essential to resist “automation bias” and ensure adequate oversight of the tool’s fairness and accuracy.<sup>38</sup> As this Article underscores, the way that this predictive enterprise operates turns not only on individual choices, but also on initial policy choices about how to constrain or channel discretion and decisional authority.

#### B. ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT: A RECENT HISTORY

The practical stakes are high because state and local jurisdictions in the United States are increasingly turning to algorithmic risk assessment. Though existing implementations span the pretrial and sentencing context, this Article focuses on pretrial risk assessment procedures like SB 10.<sup>39</sup> In the last seven years alone, half of U.S. states have either implemented or are seriously considering the use of some form of risk assessment tools in pretrial settings.<sup>40</sup> And many of these developments have been quite recent. According to the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL),<sup>41</sup> in 2017

---

38. Cf. Danielle Citron, *Technological Due Process*, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1271–72 (2008) (“The impulse to follow a computer’s recommendation flows from human ‘automation bias’—the ‘use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing.’”) (quoting Linda J. Skitka et al., *Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better Than Individuals?*, 10 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 85, 86 (2000)).

39. This narrower focus permits more detailed analysis of a particular set of interventions, without inadvertently conflating pretrial risk assessment and other forms of algorithmic criminal justice decisions, such as sentencing. However, this Article’s broader conclusions about the importance of looking at the policy design, as well as its analysis of systems in which discretion is spread across global and local layers, are more generally applicable.

40. This figure is calculated from reports published by the National Conference of State Legislatures. See *Trends in Pretrial Release: State Legislation Update Civil and Criminal Justice 1*, NCSL (Apr. 2018), [http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialEnactments\\_2017\\_v03.pdf](http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialEnactments_2017_v03.pdf) [https://perma.cc/GYS8-HS55]; *Trends in Pretrial Release: State Legislation Update Civil and Criminal Justice 1*, NCSL (Mar. 2015), [http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/NCSL%20pretrialTrends\\_v05.pdf](http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/NCSL%20pretrialTrends_v05.pdf) [https://perma.cc/B88P-CHAK].

41. This research was funded in part by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, now known as Arnold Ventures. This organization has supported the development of a widely used Public Safety Assessment (PSA) tool that has been adopted or is being implemented in over forty jurisdictions. See *Judicial Release Decisions*, ARNOLD VENTURES, <https://www.arnoldventures.org/work/release-decision-making> [https://perma.cc/G9CP-274Q] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). Though beyond the scope of this Article, the lack of independent research or oversight of these tools by bodies that are not also invested in creating them is disconcerting. Cf. *The Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” Instruments: A Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns 7*, CIV. RTS. DOCS, <http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf> [https://perma.cc/86ZC-Q8DR] [hereinafter *A Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns*] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) (“[A] pretrial risk assessment instrument must be transparent, independently validated, and open to challenge

alone, “[n]ine states enacted laws allowing or requiring courts to use risk assessments to assist in establishing bail and release conditions. Another five passed bills directing studies or development of risk assessment tools.”<sup>42</sup> These enactments are, moreover, the latest in a longer-running series of state statutes that use these tools: “Since 2012, 20 laws in 14 states created or regulated the use of risk assessments during the pretrial process. In 2014 alone, 11 laws were passed to regulate how risk assessment tools are used to help determine whether, and under what conditions, a defendant should be released.”<sup>43</sup>

Significantly, these enactments represent more than updates to technical instruments in order to keep up with the Joneses. There is also an underlying policy narrative. Like earlier historic shifts, these policies reflect a belief that more sophisticated algorithmic risk analysis tools can better account for individual defendant characteristics, rather than making a blanket choice to detain or release an individual based on their alleged charges.<sup>44</sup> And continuing debates that date to at least the 1960s, much of the discussion involves broader questions about the role of bail or non-monetary restrictions, as well as how these choices interact with fundamental rights and civil liberties. For instance, prior to California’s elimination of money bail with SB 10, a 2017 New Jersey state statute changed New Jersey’s money bail system to provide judges with algorithmic risk assessment scores, aiming to “build a better, fairer[,] and safer system of criminal justice.”<sup>45</sup>

This apparent state enthusiasm for algorithmic solutions, however, has met mounting public and scholarly debate about the ethical and legal propriety of these tools. For instance, over a hundred civil society organizations recently signed and adopted a statement of civil rights concerns.<sup>46</sup> As this document details, concerns about the use of such tools

---

by an accused person’s counsel. The design and structure of such tools must be transparent and accessible to the public.”).

42. *Trends in Pretrial Release: State Legislation Update Civil and Criminal Justice*, *supra* note 40, at 1.

43. Amber Widgery, *Trends in Pretrial Release: State Legislation 1*, NCSL (Mar. 2015), [http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/NCSL%20pretrialTrends\\_v05.pdf](http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/NCSL%20pretrialTrends_v05.pdf) [<https://perma.cc/7NM6-846B>].

44. *See id.*

45. *See* Stuart Rabner, *Chief Justice: Bail Reform Puts N.J. at the Forefront of Fairness*, NJ.COM (Jan. 9, 2017, 9:33 AM), <https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/starledgcolumn.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/T9PK-LZV8>].

46. *A Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns*, *supra* note 41; *see also More than 100 Civil Rights, Digital Justice, and Community-Based Organizations Raise Concerns About Pretrial Risk Assessment*, LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (July 30, 2018), <https://civilrights.org/2018/07/30/more-than-100-civil-rights-digital-justice-and-community-based-organizations-raise-concerns-about-pretrial-risk-assessment/> [<https://perma.cc/M7V2-8X9P>].

include, among others, the risk of data inputs that reproduce and reinforce racial inequities in the criminal justice system overall; the failure to provide adequate procedural safeguards, including individualized, adversarial hearings for all defendants; and the lack of transparency or access to the data or algorithms used by proprietary instruments.<sup>47</sup>

These long-simmering issues, moreover, began to boil over into more general consciousness with a 2016 ProPublica investigation alleging that a proprietary sentencing algorithm, COMPAS, was systematically unfair in its treatment of black defendants.<sup>48</sup> Specifically, ProPublica reported a problem with “error rate balance”: COMPAS labelled more black defendants who did *not* reoffend as “high risk” (false positives) and more white defendants who *did* reoffend as low risk (false negatives).<sup>49</sup> This research was immediately met with rebuttals<sup>50</sup> contending that the tool was fair because it exhibited “predictive parity”: at a given risk level, it predicted a roughly equal proportion of white and black reoffenders.<sup>51</sup> In addition to this technical fairness debate, which turns on how one defines fairness, others lodged critiques that no opaque, proprietary algorithm could be considered fair to a criminal defendant challenging it.<sup>52</sup> And still others, including the company that produced the tool, argued that any problem stemmed from the data

---

47. See *A Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns*, *supra* note 41. This Article reserves treatment of due process concerns and questions about whether these algorithms amount to unlawful preventative detention for separate work.

48. See Julia Angwin et al., *Machine Bias*, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing> [<https://perma.cc/9857-ZXCZ>]. For discussion of “the COMPAS debate,” see Eckhouse et al., *Layers of Bias*, *supra* note 10, at 6–7.

49. Angwin et al., *Machine Bias*, *supra* note 48.

50. See Sam Corbett-Davies et al., *A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not that Clear.*, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/> [<https://perma.cc/ZSF4-QU6K>]. But see Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, *ProPublica Responds to Company’s Critique of Machine Bias Story*, PROPUBLICA (July 29, 2016, 11:56 AM), <https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-responds-to-companys-critique-of-machine-bias-story> [<https://perma.cc/5K54-2C2U>].

51. See Corbett-Davies et al., *A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not that Clear*, *supra* note 50. For additional discussion of predictive parity, see *supra* text accompanying note 6.

52. See, e.g., Matthias Spielkamp, *Inspecting Algorithms for Bias*, MIT TECH. REV. (June 12, 2017), <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/607955/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias/> [<https://perma.cc/R6PD-LVCE>] (discussing criminal defendant’s argument that “due process was violated when the judge who sentenced him consulted COMPAS, because the workings of the system were opaque to the defendant”).

itself and not the algorithm.<sup>53</sup> From this point of view, the salient factor is the unequal base rates of recidivism among racial groups in the observed population that makes up the machine learning dataset. Given such baseline differences, any tool that applies proportionate outcomes across the board at a particular risk level will have proportionately different effects on different racial groups. The debate about technical fairness thus connects to bedrock civil society concerns about racial inequity in the criminal justice system as a whole, even as proponents of these tools assert that they represent more objective, fairer ways to make criminal justice decisions.

Recent legal scholarship echoes these points. A growing literature cautions against algorithmic risk assessment as an automatic key to a fairer criminal justice system. In addition to critiques of the biased racial impact of risk assessment<sup>54</sup> and evaluations of what fairness means in practice,<sup>55</sup> scholars have begun to assess critically the different ways in which algorithmic systems may be unfair. For example, a recent article by Laurel Eckhouse, Kristian Lum, Cynthia Conti-Cook, and Julie Ciccolini proposes three “layers of bias” that can arise in risk assessment models: first, whether the statistical model of fairness used is sound and desirable; second, whether the data itself contains embedded biases; and finally, whether it is fundamentally fair to make individualized criminal justice decisions based on statistical patterns derived from groups.<sup>56</sup> This third prong questions whether it is constitutionally valid to make criminal justice choices in this way, raising both equal protection and due process concerns.<sup>57</sup> Adding to the dialog around constitutional principles and new technical interventions, Brandon

---

53. See William Dieterich et al., *COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity*, NORTHPOINTE (July 8, 2016), <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2998391-ProPublica-Commentary-Final-070616.html> [<https://perma.cc/2TDA-25L8>].

54. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, *Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment*, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015) (“[R]isk today has collapsed into prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race. The combination of these two trends means that using risk assessment tools is going to significantly exacerbate the unacceptable racial disparities in our criminal justice system.”).

55. Again, there are myriad technical and ethical definitions that may be at odds with one another and with other values such as accuracy. For a video tutorial canvassing these issues, see Aaron Roth, *Tradeoffs Between Fairness and Accuracy in Machine Learning*, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2017), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBpd4Ix4BYM> [<https://perma.cc/EWD7-NL6D>]; see also text accompanying notes 8–10 and sources cited therein.

56. See Eckhouse et al., *Layers of Bias*, *supra* note 10, at 1.

57. This branch of the literature relies on earlier work by scholars such as Sonja Starr, who has argued that actuarial risk assessments violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Sonja B. Starr, *Evidence-Based Sentencing and The Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination*, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014). *But cf.* sources cited *infra* note 105 (suggesting that contemporary Equal Protection jurisprudence is not an apt fit for algorithmic criminal justice).

Garrett and Jonathan Monahan have also raised constitutional questions involving judges' actual use of risk assessment algorithms, noting unsettled due process questions when a judge's determination is "informed by quantitative risk assessment methods."<sup>58</sup> As Garrett and Monahan acknowledge,<sup>59</sup> and as Megan Stevenson contends in another recent piece,<sup>60</sup> despite a bevy of theoretical concern about the use of these algorithmic tools, there is an extremely limited literature on their adoption in practice.

There is not only a lack of empirical evidence about the use of algorithmic tools on the ground, but also even less sustained attention to the design of statutes and regulations and the associated protocols, norms, and institutions within which risk assessment instruments are developed and deployed. This Article provides the first in-depth evaluation of ways in which choices about how to craft a policy and how to allocate discretion and authority within new and preexisting institutions inform both the theory and practice of algorithmic risk assessment.

### III. SB 10'S STATUTORY STRUCTURE

This Part surveys SB 10 to illustrate how policymakers' choices about how to design risk assessment statutes in turn affect the creation and implementation of particular risk assessment instruments. It focuses on portions of SB 10 that grant authority and discretion to state and local actors, respectively.<sup>61</sup> This overview provides a foundation for Part IV's analysis of the specific policy and technical consequences of SB 10's statutory framework.

On its face, SB 10 grants local courts considerable discretion over the creation and implementation of the risk assessment instrument. The statute provides that local "Pretrial Assessment Services" (PAS) are responsible for pretrial risk level assessment of individuals who have been charged with a crime.<sup>62</sup> Each "particular superior court," which operates at the county level,<sup>63</sup>

---

58. Garrett & Monahan, *Judging Risk*, *supra* note 11, at 1–2.

59. *See id.* at 15–16.

60. *See* Stevenson, *Assessing Risk Assessment*, *supra* note 10, at 305–06.

61. This Article integrates proposed rules that California's Judicial Council has already published. Though it is possible that additional rules might have clarified ambiguities such as precisely what validation requires, they remain unresolved for the foreseeable future because further rule development is stayed pending the 2020 referendum. *See supra* note 12. Assumptions or inferences drawn from the available text are noted in line.

62. *See* S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1320.26(a), 1320.7(f), 1320.7(g) (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27771 and scattered sections of CAL. PENAL CODE).

63. There are 58 trial courts in California, one per county, known as superior courts. These courts have general jurisdiction over all state civil and criminal matters, unless

is to determine whether PAS in that county consists of “employees of the court, or employees of a public entity contracting with the court for those services.”<sup>64</sup> Superior courts may opt into a regional consortium or multi-county PAS with an “adjoining county,” with the limitation that “persons acting on behalf of the entity, division, or program shall be officers of the court.”<sup>65</sup> Moreover, there is local control over who makes up the “court,” which the statute defines to include “‘subordinate judicial officers,’ if authorized by the particular superior court” in accordance with the California Constitution and Rules of Court.<sup>66</sup> Superior courts thus call the shots regarding creation of the PAS as a local institution.<sup>67</sup> This localized control continues after the creation of the PAS. Each PAS is to report risk assessment information to the trial court, along with recommended post-trial conditions of release.<sup>68</sup> These recommendations are non-binding, and each adjudicating judge retains discretion regarding the final pretrial decision.<sup>69</sup>

But this local discretion is not open-ended. Creating and using a risk assessment tool entails political and technical choices. And the decisions that must be made complicate the local control narrative. More specifically, within SB 10’s statutory framework, global statutory provisions and statewide Rules of Court interact with and constrain the available set of local options. The relevant global actor for SB 10 is the California Judicial Council (Council), which acts as the “policymaking body” for the California court system. The

---

otherwise provided by statute or federal law. *See Superior Courts*, CAL. CTS., <http://www.courts.ca.gov/superiorcourts.htm> [<https://perma.cc/M6LX-ASSD>] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). The number of judges per superior court varies by the size of the county. *Id.*

64. Cal. S.B. 10 § 4 (enacted) (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7(g)).

65. *Id.*

66. *Id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7(a)).

67. Earlier versions of the statute called for a statewide oversight body to play a greater role in creation of the local PAS. *See* Sandy Uribe, Assembly Committee on Public Safety, *Senate Bill Policy Committee Analysis: SB 10 (Hertzberg)*, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. 5 (July 11, 2017), [http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill\\_id=201720180SB10](http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB10) [<https://perma.cc/P4GP-487S>] (describing an “unnamed agency” that would be authorized “to oversee pretrial services agencies, to select a statewide pretrial assessment tool, to develop guidelines, and to provide training and assistance on pretrial release”). References to the “unnamed agency” and such top-down oversight were eliminated from the statute after the Chief Probation Officers of California expressed concern that SB 10 would “inhibit[] local control and flexibility relative to allowing each jurisdiction to determine who will handle the various parts of the pretrial program . . . at the local level.” *Id.* at 15. The Judicial Council also expressed concern at an earlier stage of legislative development that SB 10 “would infringe on judicial discretion and independence.” *Id.* at 13. Subsequent versions of the statute replaced the proposed “unnamed agency” with the current structure that combines the Council’s oversight via rulemaking with increased local responsibility to ensure that the tools satisfy the standards set out in “scientific research.”

68. Cal. S.B. 10 § 4 (enacted) (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7(g)).

69. *See, e.g., id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.20(f)).

Council has long promulgated rules for the state's judicial system. Since its creation in 1926, it has operated under a state constitutional mandate to "improve the administration of justice."<sup>70</sup> In addition to general consideration for the public interest and judicial policymaking, the Council fulfills this mandate by setting official rules of court for the state.<sup>71</sup> The Council presently carries out its mission through a number of internal committees, advisory committees, and task forces, which generally include some combination of voting members and advisory members.<sup>72</sup>

In the SB 10 context, the Council manages the development of validated risk assessment tools, top-down. Specifically, the statute empowers the Council to "adopt California Rules of Court and forms" as needed to implement SB 10.<sup>73</sup> Among other responsibilities, the statute also directs the Council to:

- "Compile and maintain a list of validated pretrial risk assessment tools";<sup>74</sup>
- Identify, define, and collect "minimum required data to be reported by each court";<sup>75</sup>
- "Train judges on the use of pretrial risk assessment information when making pretrial release and detention decisions, and on the imposition of pretrial release conditions";<sup>76</sup> and

---

70. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; see also LARRY L. SYPES, COMMITTED TO JUSTICE: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2002), [http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/sipes\\_intro.pdf](http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/sipes_intro.pdf) [<https://perma.cc/4ZZM-RVS9>]. The Council consists of twenty-one voting members who are assisted by advisory members and Council staff. It is meant to be responsive to the public as a whole, and not to any particular constituency.

71. See CAL. R. CT. 10.1(b).

72. For instance, one internal committee is the Rules and Projects Committee, which "establishes and maintains a rule-making process that is understandable and accessible to justice system partners and the public." CAL. R. CT. 10.10; see generally *Advisory Bodies*, CAL. CTS., <http://www.courts.ca.gov/advisorybodies.htm> [<https://perma.cc/ZWH5-F9NV>] (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). These advisory bodies are governed by the California Rules of Court. CAL. R. CT. 10.30; see also *Judicial Council Governance Policies*, JUD. COUNCIL CAL. 4 (Nov. 2017), <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/JCGovernancePolicies.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/W5UB-4LA3>].

73. Cal. S.B. 10 § 4 (enacted) (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.24(a)).

74. *Id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.24(e)(1)).

75. *Id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1320.24(b)(1), 1320.24(e)(2)).

76. *Id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.24(e)(3)).

- Consult with the Chief Probation Officers of California and “assist courts in developing contracts with local public entities regarding the provision of [PAS].”<sup>77</sup>

These provisions, read in a vacuum, may seem unproblematic. Some form of overarching oversight is intuitively appealing, particularly to the extent that a centralized authority like the Council can prevent local jurisdictions from relying on a tool that is biased, discriminatory, opaque, or otherwise problematic. Furthermore, the form of oversight prescribed in SB 10 may appear to simply emulate the relationship between the Council and local courts in other contexts.

In the algorithmic context, however, applying the same oversight strategy is insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst. First, centralized guidance from the Council does not guarantee uniform outcomes. Consider, for instance, how risk levels are determined. According to the statutory text, the Council is to appoint a “panel of experts and judicial officers . . . [that] shall designate “low,” “medium,” and “high” risk levels based upon the scores or levels provided by the instrument for use by [PAS].”<sup>78</sup> In other words, for each county, a PAS is to generate risk “scores or levels,” and a statewide panel appointed by the Council is to designate which PAS “scores or levels” are associated with high, medium, or low risk levels.<sup>79</sup> The choice of risk threshold—which triggers the decision about how to treat an individual—is thus a global one.

Applying such a fixed global choice, however, may result in different outcomes in different local jurisdictions. As Part IV reveals, relying on the same low, medium, and high risk cutoffs in counties with different demographic distributions may produce different racial, gender, or socioeconomic effects, by county. The COMPAS debate about algorithmic unfairness arises in part from this point: if the baseline rate of arrest is

---

77. *Id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.24(e)(4)).

78. *See id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE §1320.25(a), 1320.24(e)(7)) (directing the Judicial Council to “convene a panel of subject matter experts and judicial officers” to “designate ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ and ‘high’ risk levels based upon the scores or levels provided by the instrument for use by Pretrial Assessment Services”). This text is confusing as written because the PAS “risk score” may “include a numerical value or terms such as ‘high,’ ‘medium,’ or ‘low’ risk,” yet the high/medium/low “risk level” is also to be set by the Council, based on the PAS risk score. *See id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.25(a)).

79. *Id.* The statute does not clearly state whether the threshold set by the Council can be county-specific, or whether it must be uniform across the state. If it must be uniform across the state, then this would imply a coordinated calibration of the models, which would stymie local validation of the instrument. If it can be county-specific, then there would be more local variation regarding how the statute treats individuals at a given quantitative risk level. For further discussion, see *infra* Parts IV–V.

different for white and black defendants in two jurisdictions, and the same high/medium/low risk categorization applies globally, then different proportions of individuals from each race will be affected in each jurisdiction.<sup>80</sup> Reserving any normative critique of such a result, the practical upshot is the link between global and local authority. In a regime like SB 10 that relies on a centralized definition of risk levels, global policy choices set levels of risk at specified numerical points. These global decisions implement a particular technical understanding of fairness that controls local outcomes (as a policy matter), potentially without accounting for local differences (as a technical matter). This outcome is the byproduct of technical and policy constraints, as opposed to a consciously-pursued and explicitly stated definition of what is fair.<sup>81</sup>

Second, parsing these outcomes is all the more complicated in the case of SB 10 because other portions of the statute cut the other way: they grant more authority to localities, with less precise global guidance. Specifically, SB 10 specifies a presumptive outcome for individuals that PAS assesses as “high-risk” and “low-risk,” subject to judicial override as well as a host of exceptions enumerated in the text.<sup>82</sup> For individuals deemed high and low

---

80. The COMPAS debate centers on the use of different base rates within a single county. As explored in detail *infra* Part IV, an important, yet underexplored, technical consideration involves the proper unit of analysis. This Article considers inter-county differences, including how different county-by-county racial demographics further problematize the initial decision of how to set global and local authority.

81. Some other risk assessment bills have been more explicit on this point. For example, Idaho House Bill No. 118 provided an explicit definition of fairness: “‘Free of bias’ means that an algorithm has been formally tested and shown to predict successfully at the same rate for those in protected classes as those not in protected classes, and the rate of error is balanced as between protected classes and those not in protected classes.” H.R. 118, 65th Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2019). This draft thus required predictive parity among protected classes, although this language was removed from the final statute. *See* Act of July 1, 2019, ch. 258, 2019 Idaho Sess. Laws (2019). For a discussion of predictive parity, the measure adopted by the controversial COMPAS tool, see *supra* text accompanying note 6. The California statute does not contain such an explicit operationalization of what fairness requires. Whether the definition in the original Idaho draft is normatively desirable is beyond the scope of this Article.

82. *See* Cal. S.B. 10 § 4 (enacted) (adding CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1320.20, 1320.10) (referring to high risk and low risk, respectively). As the Judicial Council’s proposed rules explain:

Prerailment release of arrested persons will depend on their assessed risk level, determined by their score from the risk assessment tool and other information gathered from an investigation done by Pretrial Assessment Services, as follows:

- Low risk: Pretrial Assessment Services must release persons assessed as low risk prior to arraignment, on their own recognizance except for those persons arrested for

risk, there are global rules.<sup>83</sup> Where PAS concludes that an individual is medium-risk, however, it is to recommend their release or detention according to “standards set forth in the local rule of court.”<sup>84</sup> SB 10 provides in subsequent text that each superior court is to set these local rules of court “in consultation with [PAS] and other stakeholders.”<sup>85</sup> The statute additionally authorizes local rules that “expand the list of exclusions for persons assessed as medium risk that [PAS] is not permitted to release,” so long as some medium risk individuals are still released.<sup>86</sup> Apart from this requirement, the local courts are constrained only by the requirement that local rules are “consistent” with the Council’s global rules of court.<sup>87</sup>

Though the relevant Council rules are in stasis for the foreseeable future,<sup>88</sup> the draft versions do not offer much more concrete guidance to superior courts. Draft Rule 4.40 provides that “[e]ach local rule must authorize release for as many arrested persons as possible, while reasonably assuring public safety and appearance in court as required.”<sup>89</sup> Without more, however, these goals of “public safety” and “appearance in court” may not amply guide or constrain local actors. As Human Rights Watch warns in its

---

misdemeanors or felonies who fall within the exclusions listed in section 1320.10(e). (Pen. Code, § 1320.10(b).)

- Medium risk: Pretrial Assessment Services has authority to release on own recognizance or supervised own recognizance, or detain prearrestment, except for those persons subject to one of the exclusions listed in section 1320.10(e) or additional exclusions that may be included by a local court rule. (Pen. Code, § 1320.10(c).)
- High risk: Pretrial Assessment Services—and the court, if the court provides prearrestment review—is not authorized to release persons assessed as “high risk.” Under sections 1320.10(e) and 1320.13(b), these persons must be held until arraignment when the court will make a release determination and set conditions of release, if applicable.

*Criminal Procedure: Proper Use of Pretrial Risk Assessment Information; Review and Release Standards for Pretrial Assessment Services for Persons Assessed as Medium Risk*, CAL. CTS. 2 (2018), <https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SP18-23.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/77EA-G2UR>] (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter *Proposed Rules 4.10 & 4.40*].

83. *See id.*

84. Cal. S.B. 10 § 4 (enacted) (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10).

85. *See id.* (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.11(a)).

86. *See id.*; *see also Proposed Rules 4.10 & 4.40*, *supra* note 82, at 13 (“If a court chooses to add to the list of exclusionary offenses or factors, the court must not adopt a rule that includes exclusions that effectively exclude all or nearly all persons assessed as medium risk from prearrestment release.”).

87. Cal. S.B. 10 § 4 (enacted) (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.11(a)).

88. *See supra* note 12.

89. *Proposed Rules 4.10 & 4.40*, *supra* note 82, at 13.

comments on this proposed rule, “[t]his statement of purpose needs some specific regulations to make it meaningful.”<sup>90</sup> Might there be reasons for local tailoring of these policy choices? Perhaps. Yet there are also institutional tradeoffs when global rules rely on local determinations to craft the policy. A framework that requires too much localization to craft the basic rules of the policy will not be globally consistent, and that lack of uniformity might itself be seen as unfair.

Regardless of the equilibrium that is ultimately struck, when human life and liberty are at stake, these choices should be made intentionally, with an awareness of the tradeoffs. Without designing a statute to account for these global-local tensions and tradeoffs, we risk encoding these understandings implicitly, in ways that are opaque and may resist democratic accountability. But the ways that risk assessment algorithms interact with systems of local and global discretion presently appear to be the inadvertent consequences of particular policy choices—not intentionally selected outcomes. With an emphasis on global-local tensions, Part IV surveys some of the ways in which implementing SB 10 as a technical matter entails policy judgments that are not explicitly specified by the statute.

#### **IV. ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE: POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SB 10 FRAMEWORK**

Using SB 10 as an example of a risk assessment statute, this Part considers how a statistically-driven risk assessment tool might operate in practice. This Part specifically focuses on how SB 10’s framework might create three categories of technical issues: proxies, Simpson’s paradox, and thresholding. This detailed analysis and associated modelling not only highlights potential specific risks of SB 10, but also illustrates more generally the manner in which a statute’s initial allocation of global and local authority will produce unexpected technical—and associated policy—consequences.

The first category, proxies, refers to features that would typically be considered valid for risk assessment, yet which are correlated with protected attributes that may not be considered for legal or policy reasons. SB 10 does

---

90. *Human Rights Watch Comments on California Judicial Council Bail Reform Rules*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018, 9:00 AM), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/10/human-rights-watch-comments-california-judicial-council-bail-reform-rules> [https://perma.cc/79U9-KSAA]; see also *Written Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation on Proposed Rules 4.10 and 4.40—Invitation to Comment #SP18-23*, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 15 (Dec. 14, 2018), [https://www.eff.org/files/2018/12/18/written\\_comments\\_of\\_the\\_electronic\\_frontier\\_foundation\\_on\\_proposed\\_rules\\_4.10\\_and\\_4.40\\_invitation\\_to\\_comment\\_sp18-23\\_december\\_14\\_2018.pdf](https://www.eff.org/files/2018/12/18/written_comments_of_the_electronic_frontier_foundation_on_proposed_rules_4.10_and_4.40_invitation_to_comment_sp18-23_december_14_2018.pdf) [https://perma.cc/7HSC-T8TB].

not contain an explicit discussion on how to handle the proxy problem. As we will see, this issue is likely to arise in risk assessment statutes more generally because neither local discretion nor a more centralized policy provides a complete solution.

The second category, Simpson's paradox, is a phenomenon in which the existence or the direction of a statistical trend differs between a global population (e.g., state) and its local sub-populations (e.g., counties). This issue is particularly acute in a statutory framework like SB 10, which relies on allocation of authority across both the global and local levels.

The final category, thresholding, refers to the process of setting qualitative risk levels associated with particular quantitative risk scores. SB 10 outlines a process in which the scores from a risk assessment tool are thresholded to group defendants into low, medium, and high risk levels, with associated policy outcomes. The policy rub is that thresholding can lead to unfair categorizations even when using scores that the relevant authority has deemed unbiased, especially where different protected groups are geographically concentrated or dispersed in different areas.

As the remainder of this Part reveals, a statutory framework like SB 10 matters because it will affect how each of these technical challenges arise and shape the available solution set.

#### A. PROXIES

As a policy matter, SB 10 and the publicly available draft rules address fairness both globally and locally.<sup>91</sup> Globally, the California Board of State and Community Corrections is to contract with independent third parties to assess the statute's effects with an emphasis on "the impact of the act by race, ethnicity, gender, and income level."<sup>92</sup> Locally, the implementing court is to "consider any limitations of risk assessment tools in general, and any limitations of the particular risk assessment tool used by [PAS], including . . . [w]hether any scientific research has raised questions that the particular instrument unfairly classifies offenders based on race, ethnicity, gender, or income level."<sup>93</sup>

Since the global requirements refer to independent audits, this Section emphasizes local fairness oversight: What might local consideration of risk assessment limitations require, and what research might be relevant to determine whether there has been unfair classification? The answer turns on technical design decisions about what kinds of information a tool can take into account. Suppose that a risk assessment instrument eliminates any use of

---

91. This analysis reflects rules made publicly available as of late May 2019.

92. Cal. S.B. 10 § 4 (enacted) (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.30(a)).

93. *Proposed Rules 4.10 & 4.40*, *supra* note 82, at 11–12.

a sensitive attribute, such as race, in making predictions about whether a given individual will recidivate. As the growing fairness literature documents, this solution does not guarantee that the tool is free of bias based on that attribute.

The problem is one of *proxies*,<sup>94</sup> a phenomenon wherein other valid features can be highly correlated with the protected attribute. Where a proxy for a protected attribute exists, decisions that incorporate a proxy variable may be biased, even when the decision does not explicitly incorporate the protected attribute.<sup>95</sup> Consider a non-technical example: the problematic historic practice of “redlining” a neighborhood, thereby permitting racial discrimination without explicit consideration of race.<sup>96</sup> Or at the individual level, a person’s name can be a proxy for gender, such that making a decision about Aaron versus Erin could permit gender discrimination without explicit consideration of gender.

Unfortunately, simply forbidding the use of proxies for protected attributes is not a viable solution. Consider a feature like education. Information about an individual’s education, such as highest degree obtained and undergraduate major, is correlated with gender,<sup>97</sup> such that education acts

---

94. Here, a proxy variable is a feature that can be used to infer one or more of the protected attribute values of an individual. A well-known example proxy for race is zip code.

95. See Eckhouse et al., *Layers of Bias*, *supra* note 10, at 15–16. Eckhouse stated:

[E]ven a determined effort to exclude proxies for race, class, or other marginalized categories [from an algorithm] is not likely to be successful . . . . [O]mitting race from the set of variables in the original data set does not mean race is not included in the analysis; it merely induces remaining variables that are correlated with both race and the outcome variable to behave as if they are, in part, proxies for race.

*Id.* (citing Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, *Big Data’s Disparate Impact*, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 721 (2016); Cynthia Dwork et al., *Fairness Through Awareness*, PROCS. 3RD INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. CONF., 214 (2012); Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, *Implementing Anti-Discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models*, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL., 206–31 (2011)).

96. “Redlining” refers to the 1930s federal Home Owners’ Loan Corporation’s practice of marking neighborhoods in green, blue, yellow, or red to demarcate their credit risk. Under this schema, “[t]he ‘redlined’ areas were the ones local lenders discounted as credit risks, in large part because of the residents’ racial and ethnic demographics. They also took into account local amenities and home prices.” Tracy Jan, *Redlining Was Banned 50 Years Ago. It’s Still Hurting Minorities Today*, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2019), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/28/redlining-was-banned-50-years-ago-its-still-hurting-minorities-today/> [<https://perma.cc/HU68-WAWK>]. This practice allowed loans to be systematically denied to residents of minority-dominated neighborhoods by invoking credit risk without explicitly referring to race or ethnicity. Such discrimination was possible because, as operationalized, credit risk was in fact a proxy for race.

97. For a visualization of this data, which is provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, see *Detailed Educational Attainment Sex Ratio*, STAT. ATLAS (Sept. 4, 2018),

as a proxy for gender.<sup>98</sup> However, it is not feasible to dismiss it entirely as a factor in decisionmaking because it may in fact be relevant to the decision. For instance, the highest degree obtained or an individual's specialty area could be highly salient in hiring an individual. A proxy variable, in short, may include crucial information for making predictions.<sup>99</sup> Accordingly, rather than omitting a proxy variable entirely, it may be more valuable to exploit it for prediction while still limiting the bias due to its correlation with the protected attributes. In fact, several works have suggested that the only way to make a system truly fair, even from the effects of proxies, is to collect and take into account the protected attribute values at the learning or prediction stage.<sup>100</sup>

SB 10's framework allocates global and local authority in a way that can produce several proxy-related issues. Recall that the Council is to "[c]ompile and maintain a list of validated pretrial risk assessment tools,"<sup>101</sup> yet a county-level superior court and the associated PAS are to ensure that the tool used in their particular jurisdiction does not unfairly classify. At the same time, assuming that the Council's rules regarding validation are in line with technical best practices, any such rules must provide for local validation and

---

<https://statisticalatlas.com/state/California/Educational-Attainment#figure/detailed-educational-attainment-sex-ratio> [<https://perma.cc/4NJR-LEQ2>].

98. Informally, correlation or dependence indicates whether a proxy variable can be used to predict one or more protected attributes. Approaches to quantify this relationship include the Pearson correlation coefficient, which measures a linear relationship between variables, and mutual information, which measures probabilistic dependence between variables. Although not explored in detail here, proxies also raise practical difficulties. Determining both the correct statistical definition to quantify the proxy effect and whether a variable is an unacceptable proxy, whether accomplished through numerical thresholds or qualitative assessment, demands substantial time and resources. These costly investments decrease the efficiency gains of a turn to algorithmic risk assessment.

99. For an excellent discussion of proxies in the disparate impact context, see Barocas & Selbst, *supra* note 95, at 720–22.

100. Some approaches include learning new representations of the non-protected attributes such that they still have predictive power while remaining independent of the protected attribute. These strategies generally require accounting for the protected attribute values at both the learning and prediction stage. At the learning stage, the restriction is placed on the data used to develop the tool. At the prediction stage, the restriction is on the features that the tool gets as input to make a prediction. See Richard Zemel et al., *Learning Fair Representations*, PROC. 30TH INT'L CONF. ON MACHINE LEARNING 325 (2013); Michael Feldman et al., *Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact*, PROC. 21st ACM SIGKDD INT'L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 259 (2015). Moreover, it is possible to make a learned tool fair by setting protected attribute specific threshold rules. See Sam Corbett-Davies et al., *Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness*, PROC. 21st ACM SIGKDD INT'L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 797 (2017).

101. S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.24(e)(1) (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27771 and scattered Sections of CAL. PENAL CODE).

adaptation of a tool that is on the approved list.<sup>102</sup> Under this structure, each local superior court remains responsible for validating the risk assessment instrument used in its respective county.

To see how this allocation of authority might operate, consider applying SB 10's structure to a hypothetical state of Idem, made up of Counties A, B, and C. The counties are identically distributed for all observable measures.<sup>103</sup> They begin with the same risk assessment tool, selected from the list that Idem's statewide council has provided. Assume further that the counties are able to tweak the preapproved tool during the validation process.<sup>104</sup> They each proceed to validate and adapt the instrument, with an eye to ensuring it does not unfairly classify on the basis of the protected characteristic of race, as the statute requires.

Suppose County A and County B, when acting in good faith to comply with the state's requirement to avoid unfair classification when applying this tool, are each concerned that the use of any racial information at all is problematic.<sup>105</sup> They therefore decide to forbid risk assessment algorithms

---

102. These validation guidelines were not completed before the statute was stayed. *See* sources cited *supra* note 13 and accompanying text.

103. Here, observable refers both to demographic characteristics and available information, such as past criminal history.

104. Again, this point is ambiguous on the face of SB 10 without more explicit rules regarding validation, which are not yet published. This assumption nonetheless illustrates how the very choice of where and in what ways to permit validation, globally or locally, is a policy decision with technical implications that tend to be underexplored at the policy design stage.

105. County A's concern could apply even if the officials are not acting with discriminatory purpose such that the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause would bar the consideration of race. As Sam Corbett-Davies and Sharad Goel explain:

[T]he dominant legal doctrine of discrimination focuses on a decision maker's motivations. Specifically, equal protection law—as established by the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment—prohibits government agents from acting with 'discriminatory purpose' (*Washington v. Davis*, 1976). It bars policies undertaken with animus (i.e., it bars a form of taste-based discrimination, since acting with animus typically means sacrificing utility); but it allows for the limited use of protected attributes to further a compelling government interest (i.e., it allows a form of statistical discrimination).

Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, *The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning*, ARXIV 4 (Aug. 14, 2018), <https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00023> [<https://perma.cc/CG8B-WNZJ>]; cf. Aziz Z. Huq, *Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice*, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1053 (2019) (articulating limitations of "equal protection jurisprudence in relation to algorithmic criminal justice" and offering that this jurisprudence "is not a coherent or morally acute metric"). For purposes of the above hypothetical, assume that there is no applicable federal statutory regime that supports a disparate impact analysis, that the state constitution does not outright bar discrimination or preferential treatment on the

from using race as a feature and also bar the consideration of proxies that might correlate with race, such as zip codes. However, they make different choices about what constitutes an unacceptable proxy. Each county makes these decisions based on the following hypothetical distribution in which white individuals are more likely to have a high school diploma than black individuals (sixty percent vs. forty percent), such that education level is correlated with race:

**Table 1. Proportionate size and high school completion rate per racial group.**

	Proportion of Population	H.S. Diploma
<b>White</b>	0.5	0.6
<b>Black</b>	0.5	0.4

Based on this finding, County A bars the use of education level in the tool. On the other hand, County B does not require that the tool be completely independent of an individual’s education level, on the grounds that it provides salient information about the risk that an individual poses. Lastly, County C permits the use of race as a feature—but the local PAS that administers the tool stipulates that it can only be used to correct for possible inadvertent bias from proxies. In other words, County C explicitly attempts to use race to achieve demographic parity, whereas the other counties bar the use of race or proxies for race. What happens when each county’s tool is applied to a demographically identical individual?

The result varies by county. First, take County A. Recall that County A does not permit the use of race or education level as a feature. The tool it uses thus outputs scores such that 0.5 of the defendants are detained, at the average risk rate of the entire population, regardless of their race or education level,<sup>106</sup> as summarized in the following table:

---

basis of a suspect classification like race or national origin, and that there is no explicit racial animus that could establish a federal constitutional violation under *Washington v. Davis* and its progeny. A state actor might nonetheless decide to avoid the use of a particular characteristic like race or gender. At least one recently-enacted statute presently takes a hardline approach of this sort and bans consideration of gender. See Ann Carrns, *In California, Gender Can No Longer Be Considered in Setting Car Insurance Rates*, NY TIMES (Jan. 18. 2019), <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/your-money/car-insurance-gender-california.html> [<https://perma.cc/9AKK-U9PD>] (quoting California Insurance Department: “‘Gender’s relationship to risk of loss no longer appears to be substantial,’ the department noted, saying the rationale for using it was ‘suspect’”).

106. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we assume here that the risk assessment tool itself makes a decision whether to detain or release a defendant. In practice, the tool outputs

Table 2. Proportion of individuals in State of Idem who pose risk, by racial group and education level.

	No H.S. Diploma	H.S. Diploma	Combined
White	0.825	0.25	0.48
Black	0.62	0.375	0.52
Combined	0.7	0.3	0.5

Although it can be considered fair because it makes no distinction between individuals by their race or education level, such a tool sacrifices accuracy as an assessment algorithm. Next, consider County B, which bars the explicit use of race but permits some consideration of education level. Such a tool can infer an individual's race through their education level. For example, as Table 2 illustrates, the average risk rate for black defendants with no high school diploma is 0.62, but a failure to account for race and to use the combined risk score would mean that black individuals with no high school degree will be detained at a higher rate of 0.7. Finally, take County C, which uses race to correct for inadvertent bias from a proxy (here, education level). By considering both an individual's race and education level and thereby explicitly accounting for proxies, County C will achieve demographic parity in the manner illustrated below in Table 3.

Table 3. Rate of detention determined by tool in County C, by racial group and education level.

	No H.S. Diploma	H.S. Diploma	Combined
White	0.85	0.27	0.5
Black	0.6	0.35	0.5

In County C, the same black individual with no high school diploma will face a 0.6 likelihood of being detained, a proportion that is lower than that in County B. Combining these three examples, the result is that three counties using the same instrument can each attempt to account for “any limitations of the particular risk assessment tool used by [PAS], including . . . [w]hether any scientific research has raised questions that the particular instrument unfairly classifies offenders based on race, ethnicity, gender, or income

---

risk scores, which are then categorized using thresholds set by the global Council. See discussion *infra* Section IV.C.

level.”<sup>107</sup> Yet each will treat an identical individual differently because they interpret unfair classification differently in their treatment of proxies.

This outcome, moreover, illustrates a broader global-local proxy tension. As a technical matter, a policy that permits each locality to determine how to handle proxies permits inconsistent decisions regarding treatment of proxies across counties. It is thus possible to have different outcomes for the same hypothetical individual based on the county where they are located, which may feel unfair from the perspective of the individual. But as a policy matter, county-level discretion about how to validate a tool may enhance local self-determination, which may feel more fair from the perspective of the locality as a whole. And the issue is even more complex because there may also be important technical reasons to permit local proxy determinations.

To see why, imagine that the global statute outright barred any use of particular protected attributes or their proxies. The trouble with such a global fiat is that the strength of the proxy, defined as its level of correlation with the protected attribute, can vary both in each county and in the state as a whole. In such a case, a county that does *not* exhibit a correlation between a protected attribute and a specified proxy would need to exclude variables that do not pose a huge proxy problem, thereby sacrificing accuracy. On the other hand, county-by-county determination of proxies is likely to be not only extremely resource intensive, but also problematic insofar as the result is a patchwork of county-by-county policy calls that make global oversight challenging. Neither a global nor a local solution is perfect. And as we will see in the following two Sections, global policy requirements come with further costs.

#### B. SIMPSON’S PARADOX

Without a uniform, top-down understanding of what fairness requires, problems might arise where global as opposed to local parsing of data leads in different directions. Specifically, applying SB 10’s requirements, there is a risk of *Simpson’s paradox*. Simpson’s paradox refers to a statistical phenomenon in which a trend appears in several subgroups of a population, yet that same trend disappears or reverses when the subgroups are aggregated.<sup>108</sup> Consider, for instance, a group of men and women who work at a university that has two departments: Department A and Department B. Imagine a hypothetical algorithm that determines who receives a positive outcome, such as promotion in the department. In Department A, twenty-five percent of women receive a favorable decision, and no men receive that decision, such that there is evidence of systematic bias against these men. In

---

107. *Proposed Rules 4.10 & 4.40, supra* note 82, at 11–12.

108. Judea Pearl, *Understanding Simpson’s Paradox*, 68 AM. STATISTICIAN 8 (2014).

Department B, 100% of women receive a favorable decision, and seventy-five percent of men do. Again, there is evidence that men are systematically less likely to receive the desirable result, even though the outcome is less skewed. Across the university as a whole, however, Table 4 outlines how there is complete gender parity, such that global oversight alone would not reveal any evidence of unfairness.

**Table 4. Proportion of individuals who receive positive decision in each subgroup and respective population size.**

	Proportion		Population Size	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>Dept. A</b>	0.25	0.00	40	20
<b>Dept. B</b>	1.00	0.75	20	40
<b>Combined</b>	0.50	0.50	60	60

This effect can also be easily found in real-life data. For instance, consider the following real-world data on education level and ethnicity from seven California counties.<sup>109</sup>

**Table 5. Proportion of individuals with four-year college degree or higher and population size (in thousands) by county.**

	Proportion		Population Size	
	White	Asian	White	Asian
<b>Fresno</b>	<b>0.30</b>	0.28	219.3	53.3
<b>Lassen</b>	<b>0.16</b>	0.07	15.9	0.3
<b>Marin</b>	<b>0.62</b>	0.59	144.3	11.4
<b>Monterey</b>	<b>0.42</b>	0.36	104.6	16.5
<b>San Mateo</b>	<b>0.56</b>	0.55	236.3	147.8
<b>Sutter</b>	<b>0.22</b>	0.21	33.0	9.2
<b>Tuolumne</b>	<b>0.22</b>	0.11	34.2	0.3
<b>Combined</b>	0.44	<b>0.47</b>	787.6	238.8

109. This data covers 2011–2015 and relies on figures made available by the California Department of Public Health. See *Educational Attainment*, CHHS OPEN DATA, <https://data.chhs.ca.gov/dataset/educational-attainment> [https://perma.cc/YCL8-PHG7] (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).

As Table 5 shows, the attainment rate of a four-year college degree in each of seven California counties is higher among the white population than among the Asian population, but the trend is reversed when these counties are grouped together.

Turning back to algorithmic fairness, SB 10 would allow Simpson's paradox to occur if there is an opportunity for discrimination against a group at the county level, yet the discrimination becomes undetectable or even reverses direction at the state level, or vice versa.

For example, an individual's education level is one factor that contemporary instruments often use.<sup>110</sup> How might this consideration play out in the SB 10 context? Suppose that at least some of the tools approved by the Council take education level into account. Suppose, further, that the seven counties shown above decide to adopt risk assessment instrument E, which considers education as a major feature. For the sake of argument, say that tool E assigns a low numerical risk score to individuals with a four-year college degree or higher, and that this assessment holds across each of the seven counties. Assume that this quantitative risk score falls into the "low risk" qualitative category for the state. In other words, across the state, tool E's assessment leads to the conclusion that individuals who have completed four or more years of higher education are, collectively, a low risk group.

But this statewide result will not necessarily lead to uniform outcomes across each of the counties in the state; to the contrary, such a scenario could easily produce differential risk assessments for members of different demographic groups. Imagine, first, that an independent statewide auditor wishes to confirm that the tool is not unfairly classifying based on ethnicity. Given the cost and difficulty of validating with reference to each individual county, such an entity is likely to validate the tool using the aggregate data alone. Based on aggregate data, the tool could be rejected for discriminating against the white population on the ground that the 0.03 difference between the respective white and Asian assignment rates to the low-risk group is

---

110. For example, COMPAS, the tool that was used in the *Loomis v. Wisconsin* case, considers education level. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., OFFENDER RISK & NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS, NAT'L CTR. STATE CTS. A-21 (2014). The Federal Pretrial Risk Assessment (PTRA) uses highest educational attainment as one of the features of its logistic regression model. See Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, *The Development of an Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services*, 73 FED. PROBATION 2 (2009), [https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/73\\_2\\_3\\_0.pdf](https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/73_2_3_0.pdf) [<https://perma.cc/D23V-HYRY>]. Several counties in Maryland also rely on locally-developed tools that take education level into account. See Angela Roberts & Nora Eckert, *As Maryland Courts Meld Artificial Intelligence into Bail Decisions, Concerns Follow*, CAP. NEWS SERV. (Dec. 21, 2018), <https://cnsmaryland.org/interactives/spring-2018/plea-bargain/pretrial-riskscore.html> [<https://perma.cc/7QA2-K6ZB>]; cf. Eaglin, *supra* note 10, at 81 (discussing factors, including education level, used in existing tools).

unacceptable. Alternatively, it could be accepted on the grounds that the 0.03 difference between the white and Asian population in being classified as low risk is negligible. Each of these conclusions is a normatively-laden policy determination, embedded in the auditing process, that merits explicit, ex ante consideration by scholars and policymakers.

Critically, even in a world where there exists global consensus on what represents an acceptable difference across demographic groups, Simpson's paradox remains at the county level. In the case of the seven California counties, for instance, a tool deemed globally fair would in fact be biased against Asians in every one of the counties. To see how, return to the hypothetical tool E described above, for which achieving a four-year degree mediates the quantitative risk assessment level and results in a low risk label. Applying such a tool to counties with the above demographics, Asians would receive comparatively higher risk scores than whites within each of the counties. Furthermore, such discrimination can be much more significant than the 0.03 difference observed at the state level. As the above chart illustrates, in Tuolumne for instance, white individuals are twice as likely to be in the low-risk group than Asian individuals. Accordingly, different local and global parsing of the same data set can make even the same outcomes seem fair or unfair, depending on which vantage point is adopted.

The existence of Simpson's paradox thus provides a hefty challenge to SB 10's validation process. While the counties are responsible for developing fair risk assessment tools at the county level, the state must also validate each tool. If the state chooses to validate tools using statewide aggregated data, then Simpson's paradox may mean that the evaluation of a tool's fairness at the state level differs from the evaluation of that same tool at the county level. On the other hand, the state's validation of a tool for each individual county is not only expensive, but also an oxymoron if the idea is a centralized, uniform validation process set forth at the state level. Moreover, Simpson's paradox can interact with, and further complicate, the proxy issues described previously. In particular, determining whether a feature is a proxy for a protected attribute involves measuring the statistical correlation, which may hide itself or even reverse direction at the state level as opposed to county level, and vice versa. There is no panacea for these global-local challenges. The only palliative is more awareness and intentionality in making initial choices about which authority is responsible for which steps, along with greater upfront specification about who is to make determinations at which points in the process.

### C. THRESHOLDING

Specific policy provisions within SB 10 also carry unrecognized technical—and human—consequences. Recall that the statute requires the

global Council to designate which PAS “scores or levels” are associated with high, medium, or low risk levels.<sup>111</sup> In operational terms, this means that each individual is first assigned a score by a risk assessment tool. Then, the individual is categorized into a risk group by thresholding their score: high risk if the score is above a certain value, low risk if it is below another value, and so on. It may be tempting to assume that for any scores generated by a fair system, however fairness is defined, a given threshold will guarantee fairness.

But the practice of thresholding itself can produce a new set of challenges.<sup>112</sup> First, as the technical fairness literature has emphasized, there are several mathematical notions of fairness, each of which may require a different set of thresholds.<sup>113</sup> For example, many notions of fairness aim to achieve a balance of classifier performance metrics, such as positive predictive value, false negative rate, and false positive rate,<sup>114</sup> between different protected groups. Scholars have shown that no single threshold rule can satisfy all three of these fairness definitions except in an unlikely assumption;<sup>115</sup> thus, choosing a threshold to enforce one notion of fairness would violate another.

This Article emphasizes a less recognized second point: even with an agreed-upon definition of fairness, enforcing it among subpopulations, such as different ethnic groups, may be impossible without setting a different threshold for each group.

---

111. Despite some textual ambiguity, the choice of the risk threshold—which triggers the decision about how to treat an individual—is up to the Council. *See supra* note 79. Again, the present discussion assumes that SB 10 provides for levels that are uniform across the state.

112. For an interactive visualization of thresholding challenges, see Martin Wattenberg et al., *Attacking Discrimination with Smarter Machine Learning*, GOOGLE RES., <http://research.google.com/bigpicture/attacking-discrimination-in-ml/> [<https://perma.cc/A6JQ-496Q>] (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).


113. *See* Narayanan, *supra* note 6.

114. In the context of pretrial risk assessment, positive predictive value refers to the proportion of high-risk individuals who indeed recidivate or fail to appear in court; false negative rate is the proportion of people who would recidivate or fail to appear but were classified as low risk; and false positive rate is the proportion of people who would not recidivate and who would appear in court but were classified as high risk. *See supra* text accompanying note 6 and sources cited therein.

115. The exception is when the base rate (e.g., the probability of recidivism or failure to appear) is equal among the protected groups. *See generally* Alexandra Chouldechova, *Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study Of Bias In Recidivism Prediction Instruments*, ARXIV (Feb. 28, 2017), <https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.00056> [<https://perma.cc/PAV8-SPT2>]. Interestingly, Northpointe cited the lack of equal base rates in the observed population as a defense of its risk assessment tool during the COMPAS controversy. *See supra* text accompanying notes 48–52.

This thresholding consideration emerges in a risk assessment policy that applies a global risk threshold across local jurisdictions—including application of the same threshold to subpopulations in a given jurisdiction.<sup>116</sup> Suppose a county consists of two ethnic groups, Green and Blue, and adopts a risk assessment tool whose scores for the Green and Blue groups are each normally distributed with mean 0.5 and 0.6, respectively, with standard deviation 0.1, as depicted in the following figure:

**Figure 1. Score distribution of Green and Blue groups: different mean.**



Imagine, further, that this tool has reached some agreed-upon balance of fairness and accuracy. Distributional discrepancy within the jurisdiction can still give rise to thresholding challenges. Recall that, under SB 10, risk refers to the “likelihood that a person will not appear in court as required or the likelihood that a person will commit a new crime if the person is released before adjudication of his or her current criminal offense.”<sup>117</sup> Applying this understanding, suppose that the statewide Council decides to categorize individuals with risk higher than 0.7 as the high risk group, indicated by the highlighted areas in Figure 1.

How might the state’s global choice affect a given county and the individuals within it to whom the tool is applied? Applying the scenario described above, among the Green individuals who would neither recidivate nor miss the court date, roughly one percent will be classified as high risk. On the other hand, this number is significantly larger—ten percent—for the Blue group. That is, a Blue individual who poses no risk is ten times more likely to be classified high-risk than they would have been if they had they

116. If each sub-jurisdiction sets its own risk threshold levels by determining what quantitative scores are associated with low, medium, and high risk categories, then the understanding of “risk” would be localized, without global consensus of the sort law typically demands.


117. S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.7(h) (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 27771 and scattered sections of CAL. PENAL CODE).

been in the Green group. Formally, the false positive rates of Green and Blue groups do not match, and the categorization would be considered unfair under this notion of fairness. In fact, in order to achieve equal false positive rates using a single threshold, we need either to classify everyone as high risk, using a threshold very close to 0, or no one as high risk, using a threshold very close to 1.

Nevertheless, we could still achieve a fair thresholding rule by setting a different threshold for each ethnic group. For instance, thresholding the Green individuals at 0.65 and Blue at 0.74 would achieve fairness with equal false positive rates of four percent. In policy terms, this would require more particularized, variable thresholding *within* a given population. But this intra-population thresholding comes at a cost: there is a tradeoff between global uniformity and localized fairness at the level of subpopulations.

Furthermore, this sort of thresholding problem can persist even when the base distributions of different subgroups are identical, due to uncertainty inherent in any statistically-derived risk assessment instrument. Consider a different hypothetical county with Green and Blue ethnic groups. Risk scores for both groups in this county are identically distributed and centered around 0.5. Suppose an algorithmic scoring system outputs a risk score with more variance for the Green group than for the Blue group. More precisely, the predicted risk scores have standard deviation 0.2 for Green and 0.05 for Blue, as shown in the below figure:

**Figure 2. Score distribution of Green and Blue groups: different variance.**



Such a phenomenon can often occur when one group, in this case Green, makes up a greater proportion of the population. Because algorithmic instruments are built to optimize a measure for the overall population, they will perform better for a group that makes up a greater proportion. Put differently, the tool will have a better predictive power for the majority group. Such a tool can be considered fair in the sense that the scores are

equally well-calibrated for both groups in the population as a whole. For example, any individual assigned a score 0.8 will indeed have 0.8 probability of committing a new crime or failing to appear in court. But the combination of the tool's quantitative scoring and the thresholding decision can still be considered unfair for members of minority subpopulations.

Again, applying the parameters of a statute like SB 10, suppose that a global body sets a threshold of 0.7 to classify an individual as high risk, regardless of their group membership in Green or Blue. In such a situation, about 0.81 of Green individuals in the resulting high-risk group would have recidivated or failed to show up, whereas this proportion drops to 0.71 for the Blue group. This is an example of a classifier failing to satisfy fairness as defined by predictive parity (the balance in positive predictive value between ethnic groups).<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, setting a threshold for each group independently could, in theory, achieve a more subgroup-sensitive understanding of fairness.<sup>119</sup> But this result would require far more localization of the overarching policy categories.

Thresholding of low, medium, and high levels can thus lead to unfair risk categorization in at least two ways. One, there may be unfairness due to distributional differences among subpopulations (e.g., ethnic, gender, or age groups). Two, there may be unfairness due to the inherent uncertainty in statistical risk assessment tools. In the case of a statute that sets global thresholding standards across the entire jurisdiction, as SB 10 appears to do, these sorts of thresholding issues become especially stark. In addition to underlying technical and normative questions about the “right” thresholding practices, the way that the statute or regulation allocates authority becomes critical. In particular, any global delineation might be difficult or even impossible to correct when the entities tasked with correcting unfairness are local. For instance, SB 10's draft guidance requires local courts to consider whether “any scientific research has raised questions that the particular instrument unfairly classifies offenders based on race, ethnicity, gender, or

---

118. Predictive parity is sometimes referred to as calibration in the technical fairness literature.

119. In fact, it has been mathematically proven that the optimal decision rule that satisfies demographic parity has to set group-specific thresholds, whether the objective is to optimize for accuracy or a more complex utility, such as balancing the social cost of releasing a high-risk individual and the cost of maintaining jails. See Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, *supra* note 105; Zachary C. Lipton et al., *Does Mitigating ML's Impact Disparity Require Treatment Disparity?*, ARXIV (Jan. 11, 2019), <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.07076.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/9S3P-WHY2>]; Aditya Krishna Menon & Robert C. Williamson, *The Cost of Fairness in Binary Classification*, CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, & TRANSPARENCY, 107, 107–18 (2018).

income level.”<sup>120</sup> Scientific research might indeed raise questions, but whether the questions matter in fairness determinations cannot be answered in the abstract. Rather, the very definition of “unfairly classify[ing]”<sup>121</sup> is bound up in antecedent global choices about risk thresholds, such that this sort of global-local allocation risks asking local actors to account for choices over which they have no meaningful input or control.

This issue can, moreover, further be compounded with demographic discrepancies among counties or between counties and the state. For example, versions of Simpson’s paradox mean that a threshold chosen to be fair at the state level may not achieve fairness at the level of individual counties. Recall how, in the first Green/Blue group example, the original threshold of 0.7 was adjusted down for the Green group and up for the Blue group in order to make the categorization fair in the sense of equal false positive rates. Suppose that this choice was made at the state level. If Simpson’s paradox is present and the distributional difference in each county reverses the direction, such that the Green group in fact has a higher mean risk score at the county level, then this pair of thresholds set by the state would be making the risk categorization less fair at the county level. Conversely, suppose once more that every county uses the same risk threshold in an attempt to be fair across the state. This approach is likely to run into different technical issues: an attempt to threshold such that the resulting risk categorization is fair in every county may not exist unless the thresholding itself is minimal, such as, for instance, a system that assigns everyone to a single risk group. In other words, an attempt to be fair at the global level may end up being unfair at the local level, yet an attempt to be fair at the local level may be technically impossible without making the instrument close to useless. This global-local tension is a hidden consequence of the technical choices required to build risk assessment instruments.

\* \* \*

The cumulative upshot of these sorts of technical considerations is that risk assessment tools require complex webs of policy and technical choices, globally and locally. Maximizing technical objectives will demand policy tradeoffs, and vice versa. A failure to begin with this ground-level awareness is tantamount to creating black box policy regimes that turn out to be Pandora’s Boxes if we try to open them down the line. The following Part thus builds from the specific tradeoffs observed in a statute with terms like

---

120. Judicial Council of Cal., *Invitation to Comment: SP18-23*, CAL. CTS. 10 (2018), <https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SP18-23.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/YV97-FNXQ>].

121. *Id.*

SB 10 and begins to distill more generally applicable principles for the design of risk assessment statutes and regulations.

## V. PATHS FORWARD

Abstracting away from SB 10's particulars, every risk assessment algorithm inevitably entails local and global allocations of authority along two related axes. One, which entity, at which level, is responsible for crafting the relevant procedures and rules or standards. This is the more traditional *policy* prong of a statute or regulation. Two, which entity, at which level, is responsible for developing, testing, and applying the instrument itself, potentially subject to local or global constraints or guidance. This is the more *technical* prong of a statute or regulation.

In practice, moreover, the picture is even more complicated because risk assessment does not allow such a crisp bifurcation of technical and policy choices.<sup>122</sup> Technical choices must account for local conditions to avoid unfair results, yet law's commitment to global first principles cuts against too much tailoring by jurisdiction.

This tension is especially stark for a multi-level intervention like SB 10 because the Council's proposed rules of court require each superior court and its associated PAS to ensure that the tool is "accurate," to assess whether it has been appropriately validated, and to consider whether there has been unfair classification.<sup>123</sup> Yet neither fairness nor the normatively proper tradeoffs between fairness and other values, like accuracy, are self-defining. Nor is there further delineation in either the statutory text or its legislative history to clarify what it means for, say, an instrument to "unfairly classif[y]" based on a sensitive characteristic.<sup>124</sup> The substance of these normative requirements, accordingly, will be defined locally. And given this inevitable tension between local tailoring and global commitments, clear oversight of the system itself is all the more critical to ensure that the system itself remains accountable. Too many *layers of discretion* at both the policy and technical levels risk creating a policy black box in which implementing an algorithm channels authority in unanticipated directions, potentially without

---

122. Cf. Alicia Solow-Niederman, *Administering Artificial Intelligence*, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) ("Algorithmic and programming decisions structure human behavior. These choices are in fact policy decisions that function at the most essential levels of democratic governance and public interests. Put simply: AI development is an especially stark example of how private coding choices are governance choices.") (on file with authors).

123. *Proposed Rules 4.10 & 4.40*, *supra* note 82, at 11–12.

124. *See id.* at 4, 11–12.

adequate democratic responsibility for the ways in which the algorithm affects actual human lives.

In the face of such complexity, we advocate simplicity. The SB 10 example suggests that risk assessment statutes will run into trouble where they create too many layers of discretion. There are two specific issues. One, if there are zones of ambiguous or even conflicting control, then there are likely to be disparate effects across localities that undermine any effort to create globally consistent policy outcomes. This will be the case when, for example, there is a top-down, statewide definition of low, medium, and high risk and a locally validated tool applied in a jurisdiction that is smaller than the state. Two, the very process of technical validation demands local determination, and an attempt to too-strictly control the tool's development and implementation top-down will undermine any effort to create risk assessment instruments that are locally accurate and unbiased. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to endorse more global or local control; such theoretical development of what to weigh in crafting a system of algorithmic governance and how to strike the right balance of global and local when it comes to both technical and policy choices awaits future research.<sup>125</sup> Nonetheless, simplicity counsels in favor of several preliminary lessons, with associated implications for SB 10.

*Less Can be More.* Tools that attempt to introduce more factors might increase accuracy, so long as the information is managed properly. Yet they might also contain more opportunities for issues, like Simpson's paradox hidden discrimination, that can elude oversight systems, particularly systems that operate at a global level and must account for many localities. For SB 10, the tools ultimately adopted, if any, should use the minimum number of factors that avoids problematic thresholding variance.

*Timing Matters.* Policymakers should take care in prescribing *when* global oversight is helpful, and what each global and local actor, respectively, is permitted to do at different stages of the tool development and deployment process. For example, if there is a list of globally approved tools that have been validated, as is the case for SB 10, may a locality undertake further validation to respond to a demographic change or a local policy, such as bail reform measures, that affect the likelihood of nonappearance? Risk assessment tools will make stale predictions if they are trained on historical data that does not account for more recent bail reforms.<sup>126</sup> To ensure that localities can update their instruments to reflect changing conditions on the ground, risk assessment statutes should both require ex post auditing of

---

125. See *supra* note 14 and accompanying text.

126. See Koepke & Robinson, *Danger Ahead*, *supra* note 13, at 24–38 (warning against “zombie predictions” that rely on stale data).

locally validated tools and be careful in calling for preapproval of tools that are removed from a particular local context.

*Audit with Attention to Local and Global Detail.* Several of the technical challenges—most notably Simpson’s paradox—that arise in SB 10 occur because of a lack of adequate attention to local data. For example, ex post auditing at the global level alone could fail to identify local treatment of a particular subpopulation that is unfair as compared to the treatment of other demographic groups in that locality.<sup>127</sup> When it comes to auditing the way that a tool classifies individuals, aggregated data is not enough. Audits must take into account localized data, not merely aggregate data. Though doing so is more cost- and time-intensive, this allocation of resources must be made before deploying the tool, as part of the initial cost-benefit analysis of a turn to risk assessment algorithms.

*Mixed Zones are a Mixed Blessing.* Policy provisions that demand both local and global control may seem like a helpful compromise. But if they are not administered carefully, they can complicate oversight of and public accountability for risk assessment instruments. Attempts to combine local and global oversight—as seen, for instance, in SB 10’s requirement that local courts assess the accuracy and discriminatory potential of tools selected from a Council-approved list—introduce a number of wrinkles.

Take validation, for instance. If a global body like the Council truly validates a tool, then it is not clear how a locality could adapt it to meet technical best practices and still permit global confidence in the tool. On the other hand, if the locality validates the tool, then substantial resources will be required for the global body to be certain that it meets its validation requirements, or there will be no meaningful oversight.

The most auspicious way to manage these global-local tensions is to approach mixed zones with caution. Caution in crafting a policy means proceeding with an ex ante awareness of and explicit delineation of which level(s) must participate at a given stage in the process, as a technical matter, and how these considerations align with the allocation of decision-making authority, as a policy matter. It also requires thinking carefully about how to grant decision-making and oversight responsibility, particularly if a proposed policy requires both local and global participation.

*A Dash of Discretion.* When used sparingly, allocating additional discretion within the statute might at times solve particularly thorny technical issues. For instance, in thresholding, SB 10 appears to provide that the same high/medium/low risk threshold set shall be applied to already-developed assessment tools. However, as Part IV describes, this situation could lead to

---

127. See discussion *supra* Section IV.B.

an impasse where the risk group assignment cannot be made fair without setting different thresholds for different protected subgroups or altering the tools with respect to the given threshold set. In the former instance, the global entity that sets the threshold would need additional discretion to set different qualitative risk levels associated with different subgroups, however identified. In the latter instance, localities would need additional discretion to develop and validate tools that meet the subgroup-independent thresholds in the context of that locality. Risk assessment policies, in short, must permit additional tailoring if the global thresholds are to be considered fair in particular counties, whether the discretion to tailor as required is allocated globally or locally.

*Define Fairness and Specify Who Decides.* Even if no single definition of fairness is likely to be without controversy, risk assessment statutes should say what they intend as a *technical* matter when it comes to such a critically contested term. When these points are unspecified, they still must be made, but the choices will tend to be implicit—as a matter of technical development—without upfront consideration, adequate opportunity for public debate, or ongoing accountability for the decision. By first clearly defining whether a global or local entity is responsible for arriving at what is fair, and, second, designing policies that designate what fairness means as a technical matter, we can better begin to grapple with the underlying normative implications of the statutory text. A critical matter for future research is whether, as a normative matter, fairness must be defined locally—lest the top-down imposition infringe on community values—or globally—lest too much tailoring to community norms contravene non-negotiable first principles.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Developing and deploying risk assessment algorithms without considering how they will fit within new and existing institutions, norms, and preexisting technical and policy constraints is a mistake. The example of SB 10 highlights how risk assessment tools are not instruments that operate in isolation; rather, they are developed and deployed within legal institutions and require input from global and local decisionmakers. Control of these instruments, in turn, requires keener attention to the design of risk assessment policies, and specifically to who is granted authority and discretion over the tools. When a particular statute or regulation empowers an actor at the global level to develop a list of approved tools, for instance, how does this choice interact with the technical needs of local actors or cabin local policy discretion? Conversely, if a statute or regulation requires local validation, what limitations does this place on global oversight of the tool?

This Article encourages policymakers and technologists to ask these and related questions, by design.

Initial statutory and regulatory decisions should thus be made with attention to local-global tradeoffs, technical limitations, non-negotiable policy objectives, and underlying normative principles. A failure to grapple with these questions will not erase them. Where there are too many layers of discretion and too many local-global tensions, we would be ill-advised to rely on algorithmic risk assessment instruments as criminal *justice* tools.